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Abstract 
Geo-economic tensions and global collective action problems call for international cooperation to revise and de-
velop rules to guide both the use of domestic subsidies and responses by governments to cross-border 
competition spillover effects. Current WTO rules that divide all subsidies into either prohibited or actionable cate-
gories are no longer fit for purpose. Piecemeal efforts in preferential trade agreements and bi- or trilateral 
configurations offer a basis on which to build, but are too narrow in scope and focus. Addressing the spillover ef-
fects of subsidies could start with launching a work program at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO to 
mobilize an epistemic community concerned with subsidy policies, tasked with building a more solid evidence 
base on the magnitude, purpose and effects of subsidy policies.  
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Bertelsmann Stiftung and WTO Reform 
If international trade is not governed by rules, mere might dictates what is right. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) serves as a place where trade policy issues are addressed, disputes arbitrated, legal frameworks derived 
and enforced. Through these functions, the WTO ensures that the rules of trade policy are inspired by fairness and 
reciprocity rather than national interest. It is more important than ever to vitalise the global public good that it rep-
resents against various threats that have been undermining it. 
The Global Economic Dynamics project of Bertelsmann Stiftung is a firm believer in rules-based international trade 
and the WTO. In 2018, we published an extensive report with propositions on how to revitalise the WTO, based on 
the deliberations of our High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. In 2019 and 2020, 
we follow up on this report with a series of policy contributions, providing fresh ideas and elaborating on concepts 
already introduced in the report. These contributions cover the areas of the Appellate Body crisis, dealing with the 
competitive distortions caused by industrial subsidies, enabling Open Plurilateral Agreements within the WTO while 
providing reassurance to concerns of the membership at large with such forms of flexible cooperation and, finally, 
improving working practices in WTO Committees. 
We are grateful to Professors Bernard Hoekman and Douglas Nelson for their expertise and advice which have 
been a strong support for our WTO activities in general and for this paper specifically. 
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Director, Program Megatrends   Project Manager, Global Economic Dynamics 
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Executive Summary1 
A central source of current trade tensions are national subsidy policies. This is not simply a ‘China issue’. Subsi-
dies constitute the great majority of trade interventions imposed since 2009. Data on non-tariff policies are 
notoriously patchy, as WTO notification requirements generally are only partially complied with, if at all. An inde-
pendent initiative that compiles data on trade policies, the Global Trade Alert, has documented over 20,000 policy 
measures affecting trade taken since 2009 by G20 members, with subsidies accounting for more than 50 percent 
of all measures.   
Any policy by a government that disadvantages one activity relative to another will have advantage the latter. It is 
therefore necessary to recognize that if the goal is to discipline policies that give rise to negative international spil-
lovers, the focus of attention must be on effects as opposed to narrowly defined policy instruments. The focus of 
WTO subsidy rules is on potential adverse effects of national measures on foreign products. A broad notion of 
actionable subsidies is used: measures that impose a direct burden on the government budget (including fiscal 
transfers through tax expenditures). To be actionable a subsidy must be specific (as opposed to benefitting eco-
nomic activity more generally), and convey a benefit to the recipients. Financial support for exports and local 
content requirements are prohibited.  
Historically, the center of attention of WTO members on subsidies has been agriculture, reflecting the extensive 
trade-distorting support provided by European countries in particular to this sector in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
main WTO instrument for non-agricultural subsidy-related policies, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervai-
ling Measures, prohibits export subsidies and regulates the use of countervailing duties to offset injurious effects 
of foreign subsidies on domestic producers.  The agreement applies only to trade in goods. 
WTO disciplines were crafted in the 1980s, before the rise of global value chains, the emergence of China as a 
major trading nation, and the growth in trade in services and the digital economy. They are outdated. They do not 
cover investment incentives or services activities. They leave unclear how to treat the activities of state-owned 
enterprises and whether such entities are a ‘public body’ or whether input subsidies or differential taxes that lower 
domestic prices of inputs are covered.  
Unlike tariffs, subsidies are appropriate instruments for many policy goals, but like tariffs they will generally have 
spillovers via effects on trade. To be successful, any revision of the international subsidy regime must rest on a 
clear understanding that the economics and politics of subsidies differ across polities; consider the goals that mo-
tivate their use; and the nature of cross-border spillovers they create. Virtually any significant policy action by a 
large trading economy will affect trade, often but not always unintended. The optimal response to spillovers will 
vary depending on the policy-maker’s objective function.  
WTO rules pay no attention to the objectives of governments using subsidies. There is no notion in the WTO of 
what constitutes a “good” subsidy. This contrasts with the EU and some recent trade agreements that recognize 
the legitimate role of certain types of subsidies and establish a presumption these are not objectionable. An eco-
nomic approach is used to assess whether a subsidy effectively addresses a market failure or objectives of 
common interest, balanced against associated negative effects on competition in the relevant market. An im-
portant feature is a shift away from rigid ‘hard law’ rules to focusing on the effectiveness of subsidies in attaining 
economic and noneconomic objectives and their effects on markets. 
The international subsidy regime can move in this direction through application of relatively simple, robust rules of 
thumb derived from the theory of economic policy. These recognize the right of nation states to engage in a wide 
range of domestically warranted subsidy policies, but also that conflicts will emerge over modalities and levels of 
                                                     
1 This note summarizes the main arguments of two papers by the authors: (i) Subsidies, Spillovers and Multilateral Cooperation; and (ii) Re-
thinking International Subsidy Rules. 
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acceptable competitiveness spillovers. Making such conflicts the subject of technical discourses focused on es-
tablishing the goal of a subsidy, whether it addresses a market failure, and whether trade spillover effects are 
necessary to achieve the goal may deflect much of the political heat associated with conflicts over inherently do-
mestic issues. 
A revamped subsidy regime requires participation of the United States, the European Union, and the People’s 
Republic of China – the three global trade powers. The rules must be seen as supporting the generalized gains 
from open trade and global production, not an attempt to isolate or ‘reform’ China. At the same time, China should 
accept that it has a leading role to play in the regime. The three majors should recognize that their political econo-
mies are consistent with a broadly liberal international regime even though they are, and will remain, profoundly 
different from one another.  
Accommodating system differences will be facilitated by distinguishing between competitive spillovers arising 
from policies to address global collective action problems and market failures and those stemming from national 
industrial policies. The former should be treated differently from the latter. A corollary is that governments must 
both elucidate their policy goals and cooperate in determining the magnitude and incidence of any cross border 
spillovers. A rule of thumb creating a presumption in favor of national treatment can narrow the range of conflict, 
as nondiscrimination will be more efficient in attaining policy objectives.  
This is not new ground for the WTO. An initial, time-limited effort was made to include a category of nonactio-
nable subsidies in the WTO, but this expired in 1999. It was too narrow, and did not distinguish subsidies that 
address (global) market failures from those that do not. It is past time that WTO members revisit what was started 
over 20 years ago. Preparing the ground requires a collective effort to measure and analyze the prevalence and 
effects of subsidies, using robust, transparent methodologies. A cooperative rather than adversarial approach is 
called for, centered on deliberation informed by a concerted data collection program and analysis.  
At this point in time, no international platform exists that brings together national Finance and Economy ministries, 
national competition authorities and international organizations concerned with the governance of subsidies. Buil-
ding bridges across these groups can help provide a basis for mutually beneficial cooperation on the use of 
subsidies and meaures to address the negative competitive effects of such policies. The more that the use of 
subsidies is treated as a technical, not a political, endeavor the greater the likelihood of an epistemic community 
on subsidy issues taking root. 
Development of a body of professionally competent, peer reviewable, internationally balanced work will generate 
common ways of talking about and thinking about the issue of subsidies. For all the differences in national econo-
mic and political regimes, a better understanding of the goals, prevalence and effects – and effectiveness – of 
subsidies may support agreement over time on good practice norms and standards.  As those become more wi-
dely accepted, national governments can legitimate subsidy policy internationally by adopting those standards.  
Delegation of both measurement and analysis to a trusted, neutral and technically capable body is critical to sup-
port the needed deliberation by states. The OECD has played this role for decades in producing comparable 
analyses of subsidy regimes in agriculture. This work illustrates the importance of going beyond documenting po-
licies to measure the magnitude of interventions using well-defined indicators. Producer support estimates played 
such a role in agriculture – analogous measures should be developed that are not sector-specific and permit mo-
nitoring and assessments of the economic incidence and effects of subsidy policies.  
Many international organizations collect information and monitor the use of different types subsidy instruments. A 
joint initiative that encompasses the relevant specialized international organizations to develop and apply approp-
riate measures and analysis of subsidy policies would provide the technical basis for more informed discussion 
and the design of cooperation in this area. The G20 Trade and Investment Working Group, an existing mecha-
nism that includes the core international agencies and in which the major emerging economies are members, 
could be the focal point of such an initiatve. 
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The WTO should provide a platform to members willing to invest resources into a work program to compile infor-
mation and analyze existing subsidy programs in systemically important economies, bringing together the 
epistemic community with expertise and interest in subsidies. This could include organizing regular thematic ses-
sions of the WTO Committee dealing with subsidies; creating a dedicated Working Party spanning different WTO 
bodies concerned with subsidy matters, including those where no rules exist presently (e.g., services); or laun-
ching a new plurilateral effort along the lines of the ‘joint statement initiatives’ launched in 2017 at the 11th WTO 
Ministerial Conference.  
A first step can be taken at the next WTO ministerial conference by launching a international work program on 
subsidies. This may be criticized as kicking the can down the road. It is not. WTO members simply do not have 
sufficient information to develop a common understanding of where new rules are needed and the form they 
should take. Calling a time out on the current focus on unilateral action and bilateral/trilateral talks to establish 
such an understanding is a necessary condition for keeping the WTO relevant in the 21st century. 
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Introduction 
The US, the driving force behind the trading system throughout its life of more than half a century, is currently led 
by a self-professed “tariff man” with a penchant for straightforwardly mercantilist thinking. The US has launched a 
trade war with China, orchestrated the collapse of the WTO dispute settlement appeals mechanism, and is de-
manding major changes to international rules of game pertaining to trade-related policies. In this paper we focus 
is on one of the central sources of trade tensions: national subsidy policies. This is not simply a ‘China issue’. 
Subsidies and domestic regulation more generally have risen in significance for the core members of the liberal 
trading system.  Subsidies constitute the great majority of trade interventions imposed since 2009 (Evenett, 2019; 
Hoekman and Nelson, 2020).   
Unlike tariffs, subsidy policies are the natural, and appropriate, instruments for the pursuit of a wide variety of po-
licy goals, but like any policy of economic significance, they will generally have spillovers via effects on trade.2 Of 
course, governments may also adopt subsidy policy with the explicit intention of affecting trade flows.  In either 
case, subsidy policies create tension between the gains from openness and losses of sovereignty in particularly 
stark and difficult ways.  The problem is rendered more difficult because unlike tariffs, which relate to both the 
economic and political system in broadly similar ways, subsidies are embedded in both systems in nationally dis-
tinctive ways. Any rethinking of the international subsidy regime must rest on a clear understanding of the 
economics and politics of subsidies and the nature of cross-border spillovers created by national policies.  
We begin in Section 1 with a description of a simple, but robust framework for thinking about subsidies. Section 2 
discusses spillovers and their measurement. Section 3 argues that because subsidies are embedded in nationally 
distinctive economics and politics, rule-making efforts need to take a ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective.3  In 
Section 4 we briefly characterize extant examples of multijurisdictional cooperation on subsidies. Section 5 distils 
some principles for an international subsidy regime suggested by existing regimes and the theory of economic 
policy. Section 6 discusses options for moving forward incrementally on rulemaking. Section 7 concludes.  
 
1 Subsidies in the Theory of Economic Policy 
A significant policy will have (generally sizable) spillovers affecting sectors and agents not directly the object of 
that policy.  In fact, the presence of such spillovers is as good a definition of policy significance as any other.  
Whether one is interested in tracing the effects of policy (positive analysis) or identifying optimal policy (normative 
analysis), a framework is needed that recognizes market interdependence.  Economists have developed just 
such a framework in the theory of economic policy.  The theory of economic policy builds on the traditional gen-
eral equilibrium theory of welfare economics to produce a simple, but robust, framework for organizing analysis of 
economic policy. 
The foundation of the theory of economic policy is the set of marginal conditions that characterize equilibrium in 
the perfectly competitive economy.4  Contrary to the common representation of economist policy advice, the the-
ory of economic policy neither assumes that the existing economy is perfectly competitive, nor that policy should 
seek the perfectly competitive state.  A key distinction in the theory of economic policy is between policy goals 
                                                     
2 In this paper we use the term subsidies to include transfers via tax expenditures, i.e., our focus is on measures that (dis-)incentivize certain 
types of economic activity. See OECD (2011).  
3 See e.g., Hall and Soskice (2001). 
4 In the textbook general equilibrium 2 good  2 factor  2 household-type economy, these conditions involve equality of marginal rates of 
technical substitution across all producing firms, marginal rates of substitution across all households, and the “top level condition” that the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods (MRS) is equal to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between the 2 goods in 
production and that these are equal to the relative price, i.e., MRS = MRT = p.  For a large, open economy we must substitute the marginal 
rate of transformation through trade (FRT), which will not generally be equal to the price. 
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that seek to establish efficiency in the face of a deviation from the perfectly competitive norm (an economic objec-
tive) and objectives that, even in the context of perfect competition, require a policy that causes a deviation from 
the perfectly competitive norm (a noneconomic objective).  It is often the case that a first-cut at the analysis of a 
given policy problem involves assuming the existence of a single objective in the context of an otherwise un-
distorted environment, but the general framework is easily extended to incorporate multiple objectives as well as 
many goods, many factors, many types of households and many countries.5   
Analysis requires a specific objective function: “optimal policy” implies that there is an objective function to opti-
mize. Efficiency could be a goal of economic policy, and will be if the objective is an economic one. Whatever the 
goal, the theory of economic policy embodies a preference for (constrained) efficiency in policy intervention: doing 
so at the lowest cost in terms of the objective function. The theory of economic policy, as a basic framework, 
comes down to providing answers to three sets of questions: 
 What is the problem/goal? 
 How can we evaluate (i.e. rank) possible instruments in terms of objectives and costs? 
 What is the best option among these candidates, taking into account constraints on policy choice specific 
to the case at hand? 
With respect to the first question, the clearer we are about the problem, the clearer we will be about responses.  
Precisely because they involve deviations from the perfectly competitive norm, economic objectives are relatively 
straightforward.  We simply need to identify the relevant distortion(s).  These distortions are easily representable 
in terms of failure of one, or more, of the marginal conditions that characterize equilibrium.  The clarity gained 
from searching for the distortion is one of the key features of the theory of economic policy. Consider the widely 
deployed infant-industry argument for trade intervention.  The notion that local firms cannot compete with more 
efficient foreign firms now, but with a modest period of protection they will become globally competitive, seems to 
many policymakers and citizens as nothing more, or less, than common sense.  The problem is that the premise 
that projects in this sector have positive net present value implies the market should be willing to invest in them.6  
The issue is not the presence of foreign competition, but the lack of investors willing to support profitable invest-
ments.  As this is what capital markets are for, local firms either lack access to a functioning capital market or 
there is a dynamic externality.7  In either case, once we have identified the distortion, we can proceed to a consid-
eration of interventions. 
Noneconomic objectives are inherently trickier because they imply a goal whose existence is not observable in a 
first-order way.8 A government may have a revenue goal, or an income distribution goal, or a national defense 
goal, but the magnitude of that goal (to say nothing of the goal itself and its relationship to other goals) has no 
obvious measure.  Of course, this does not mean that such objectives are any less central to the program of a 
given government, or society, than economic goals. Moreover, a given policy can shift from one category (none-
conomic v. economic) to the other.  Consider the case of anti-trust policy (Eisner, 1991).  From the early years of 
                                                     
5 An important practical difficulty is that as the number of objectives increase, the complexity of optimal policy (for virtually any objective func-
tion), or the optimal marginal change in policy, increases.  This is the central message of the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 
1956). Another practical problem is that as the heterogeneity of preferences increases, even fairly modestly, the ability to solve for an optimal 
policy decreases, essentially to zero, as shown by the Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, section 17.E).  Alt-
hough intuition can be framed by relatively simple, low-dimensional models, the passage to practical policy advice must involve detailed 
specific knowledge of the actual policy environment. 
6 In fact, as Bastable noted in extending Mill’s theory of infant industry protection, the evaluation of net present value must take into account 
not only the private opportunity cost of funds invested in the sector, but also the additional costs associated with the policy (e.g. the costs of 
protection) (Kemp, 1960). 
7 The modifier “dynamic” reflects the fact that this is an argument for “infant” industry protection.  That is, whatever the source of the failure to 
invest, it must disappear in a reasonable period of time. 
8 The difference is that in the case of economic objectives the magnitude of the distortion and cost of any degree of remediation of the distor-
tion are rendered relatively more transparent by the fundamental focus on efficiency. 
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anti-trust policy (i.e. the late 19th century in the US), the political power of the Trusts was a more significant a con-
cern of the US government, and the citizenry at large, than the economic effects of large economic entities.  
Thus, attempts to regulate the Trusts reflected primarily a non-economic objective.  The early economics of anti-
trust, the so-called structure-conduct-performance (SCP) or “Harvard School” provided an economic analysis 
focused on size (this was the “structure” part) that was quite consistent in its implications with the central interest 
in market power.  That consistency led to a willingness, though certainly contested, to incorporate economic anal-
ysis in the regulatory politics of antitrust.  As economists interested in industrial organization shifted away from 
the SCP framework, toward an analysis emphasizing outcomes independent of structure in the first instance (the 
so-called “Chicago school”), and as legal training began to incorporate this latter sort of economics, antitrust 
came increasingly to be seen as primarily about economic efficiency.  That change, in turn, affected the view of 
antitrust enforcement taken by those charged with implementation (both the judiciary and the executive branch).   
One result of this change, consistent with our earlier comment on the difference in ease of implementation of eco-
nomic versus noneconomic objectives, was that antitrust increasingly became seen as a technical administrative 
issue (i.e. it was less freighted with political conflict).  In particular, the judiciary and the administrative branch 
came to see the key issues in antitrust in the same way.  Furthermore, while considerable differences remain, 
competition authorities (both judicial and administrative) across countries began to share a common language 
and analytical framework for the analysis of potential anti-competitive behavior. We argue below that the analysis 
of trade policy in general, and subsidy policy in particular, does not share a common language and that the at-
tempt to develop one would be a major advance in supporting cooperation on subsidy policy. 
Once the objective is identified, the next step is to evaluate the menu of policies available to pursue it and rank 
them in terms of cost and benefit. In principle, the list of policies could be taken to include the full range of actions 
available to a government, but many of those actions have prima facie little effect on the objective and some posi-
tive cost, or even move the equilibrium with policy further away from the goal.  Those actions can be easily 
rejected.  To assess the impact of a policy, we need to consider not only the immediate effect on the objective, 
but the full general equilibrium effects.  Thus, the answer to the second question is a list of policies ranked from 
the lowest cost per measure of effect on the objective to the highest.   
To illustrate the logic, consider the simple, open economy case. Because a tariff is equivalent to a production 
subsidy and consumption tax at the same rate,9 if an objective relates to the structure of production or consump-
tion exclusively, a consumption tax-cum-subsidy or a production tax-cum-subsidy will generally be preferred to a 
tariff. This is because use of trade policy involves additional costs associated with its effects on the other side of 
the market.  This is the basis of the theoretical preference for subsidies widely noted in the trade law-and-eco-
nomics literature on subsidies (Sykes, 2005).10  When thinking about the optimal policy, the level of intervention is 
as important as the choice of instrument. Setting the level of intervention too low or too high may well reduce the 
level of satisfaction of the objective function below what would arise without intervention. 
To summarize: (i) there are a variety of cases for government intervention in the economy, both in support of the 
efficient functioning of the economy (economic objectives) and to pursue social, political or other goals (noneco-
nomic objectives); and (ii) some form of subsidy will generally be the preferred form of intervention. 
 
                                                     
9 Lerner symmetry (Lerner, 1936) suggests that import and export taxes are symmetric, but this is sensitive to some core assumptions 
(Costinot and Werning, 2019). 
10 Although there is always an equivalence between a price intervention and a quantity restriction at a particular moment, in a complex envi-
ronment, especially one characterized by random shocks, a price intervention will generally be preferred to a quantity restriction precisely 
because the quantity restriction freezes quantity adjustment in a way that a tax-cum-subsidy intervention does not. 
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2 International Spillovers in the Theory of Economic Policy 
The warrant for applying general equilibrium reasoning to the analysis of a specific policy is that the policy is “sig-
nificant” in the sense of having spillovers to agents and sectors beyond those of immediate interest to the given 
policy.  The same logic suggests that significant policies are likely to have international spillovers as well.  As with 
the domestic evaluation of policy, a characterization of an objective function is needed to evaluate spillovers.  Alt-
hough a given national policy can be evaluated from the point of view of “global welfare” (however defined), in the 
absence of an entity for whom that is meaningful, we will focus on national decision-makers, i.e., we are inter-
ested in the effect on country B of a policy adopted by country A. 
Many agents (individual and collective) will be affected.  Thus, we might want to know:  
 What is the effect of the country A policy on aggregate welfare in country B; 
 What is the effect of country A policy on the distribution of global income between A and B; or 
 What is the effect of country A policy on the distribution of income within country B. 
Beyond the economic effects, we might want to know: 
 What is the effect of country A policy on the relative international power/influence of country B; or  
 How does country A policy affect the domestic political prospects of specific agents in country B? 
These, and other effects, may all be relevant in some way to the relevant decision-maker in country B.  Infor-
mation on the preferences of that decision-maker is necessary to analyze the appropriate response to a spillover.  
Except under very restrictive assumptions, optimal response to spillovers will vary greatly with the specification of 
the policy-maker’s objective function.  Much analysis proceeds as if the decision-maker is a representative agent 
maximizing a more-or-less standard utility function.11  While it is hard to conceive of another baseline from which 
to begin the analysis of spillovers, it is equally hard to imagine that there is much empirical content in analysis 
based on these assumptions. 
Be that as it may, as an easy example of policy spillover, consider the case of trade policy between two economi-
cally large economies—A and B.12  Suppose that, for some reason unrelated to trade policy goals, country B 
adopts a tariff.13  Because country B is large, its tariff policy will affect the world price.  That change in price will 
affect country A in a number of ways: 
 If B’s tariff falls on A’s importable (as would be the case in a 2-country world), B’s terms-of-trade deterio-
rate, probably resulting in a fall in aggregate welfare (certainly in the case of a standard representative 
agent); 
 Global income falls and, for a sufficiently small country B tariff, B’s national income rises and A’s falls; 
                                                     
11 If we are willing to assume that all country B households are characterized by identical Gorman polar form preferences (e.g. quasi-linear or 
homothetic) and the policy-maker is a utilitarian, then the policy-maker will act as if she is a representative agent maximizing a well-behaved 
utility function. This approach is currently so common that many analysts treat these assumptions as a reasonable approximation to a true 
model of reality. Alternatively, we could assume that the decision-maker is a Samuelsonian social planner that carries out appropriate redistri-
bution in the background and so, again, acts like a representative agent maximizing a well-behaved utility function. 
12 When referring to components of a model economy generically, I will refer to the index sets: factors of production i  I; produced goods j  
J; households h  H; and countries k  K.  Thus, here K is either A or B. 
13 As we have seen in our discussion of the theory of economic policy, a tariff will often be a second-best instrument for pursuing economic or 
non-economic objectives.  Here, we are not concerned with country B’s reason for adopting a tariff. 
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 Income distribution in A will change (if A is a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson economy, with household het-
erogeneity in factor-ownership) the Stolper-Samuelson theorem tells us exactly what happens to the 
income distribution; 
 If A has pre-existing distortions, the change in the world price will interact with those distortions, poten-
tially raising or lowering welfare. 
Policymakers in A need not know that the price change was caused by a change in tariff policy to observe the 
price change and its effects. If, for example, they have a conservative social welfare function, a tariff could be a 
first-best response to a trade price shock.14 If country A adopts a tariff to offset the effect of the terms-of-trade 
shock (caused by B’s tariff), and A is large, A’s tariff will affect B’s terms-of-trade and will, at least partially, undo 
the effect of B’s policy. 
If we assume that both national policy makers are aware of the source of the spillover (i.e. the trade policy of the 
other country), we move into the realm of trade war.  That is, once we assume that each country’s trade policy, 
and its effect on the national economy, is observable, it seems unlikely that either will eschew retaliation.  There 
is a long tradition of research on trade wars.  This literature builds on the theory of optimal tariffs (a specific appli-
cation of the theory of economic policy in which international market power creates a first-best, economic 
argument for tariff policy) by making both/all countries policy active.  Under standard assumptions on the eco-
nomic structures of the national economies, preferences and knowledge of national decision-makers, it is 
straightforward to solve for the Nash equilibrium in tariffs. Although the assumptions involved are useful in gener-
ating simple intuition, they are so wildly counterfactual they make the analysis useless for policy purposes. That 
said, attempts to compute these Nash equilibrium tariffs for major trading nations generally suggest tariff levels 
well-above observed tariffs (Bekkers et al., 2020).  
The key to both the academic research and the practical successes of trade liberalization from the latter half of 
the 20th century is the transparency of the tariff as an instrument of policy.  Not only is the tariff patently a trade 
policy, but as a price measure it is relatively easy to calculate the economic effects in ways that are comparable 
across nations.  Even in a world with complex production structures and international value chains, tariffs remain 
relatively transparent.15  Both the direct price effect and the transparent effect on trade of these have been essen-
tial to negotiations on the tariff.  When we turn to the analysis of subsidies, neither will be present. 
3 Rulemaking to Address Subsidy Policy Spillovers 
A large country engaging in a subsidy policy, regardless of its intended link to trade flows, will generally have in-
ternational spillovers like those deriving from tariffs.  Thus, virtually any significant policy action by the 
government of a large trading economy will affect trade, often but not always unintended.16  
                                                     
14 Corden (1997) defines the conservative social welfare function as “including the following distribution target: any significant absolute reduc-
tions in real incomes of any significant section of the community should be avoided” (p. 74). This helps understand the inclusion of escape 
clauses in trade law, e.g. Article XIX in the GATT/WTO or Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended) in US trade law. See Deardorff 
(1987). 
15 The sizable literature on effective rates of protection (protection to value added in an environment with multiple purchased inputs) deals with 
complex production structure.  New research on trade in value added extends these methods to incorporate global value chains (Johnson, 
2018).  That same research suggests that most of this trade is carried out by very large firms.  Thus, not only is the production structure com-
plex, but we would expect these firms to recognize their market power in their (private) decision-making.  Unfortunately, solving for an optimal 
tariff structure in the context of such linkages and market power would seem to require information that is simply not available to governments. 
16 Trade economists are quick to point out that any such policy could be intended to affect trade flows/prices, but in a world of very large firms 
engaged in global production and sales, instead of a world in which final goods are produced in one place and sold on the international mar-
ket, tariffs will generally be a rather blunt instrument of trade policy compared to subsidies targeted on specific parts of the value chain 
(Bloningen, 2016). 
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The goal of the current international regime for the regulation of subsidies—the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)—is to reduce conflict over subsidies that affect trade.  In pursuit of this 
goal, the ASCM defines subsidies as a financial contribution by a government (public) body that confers a benefit 
to a specific recipient.17 Importantly, it does not matter what the objective is of a government using a subsidy: 
there is no notion in the WTO of what constitutes a “good” subsidy. An effort to do so was embodied in the 
ASCM, which distinguished between prohibited, actionable and permitted/non-actionable subsidies. Loosely 
speaking prohibited subsidies encompass measures clearly intended to interfere with trade, nonactionable subsi-
dies spanned measures targeting widely agreed goals of national government (regional aid, environmental policy, 
support for R&D), and everything else was lumped into the actionable category. In principle, these categories re-
flect the intentions of the policymakers with respect to the goals of policy but the implementation ended up 
emphasizing modalities of intervention more than the objectives.   
The nonactionable category embodied in Art. 8 ASCM expired in 1999, leaving only two categories: prohibited 
subsidies and everything else. The latter can be the subject of either countervailing duties (CVDs) or WTO dis-
pute settlement actions in cases where a subsidy causes adverse effects on competition in third markets. WTO 
disciplines seek to constrain the abuse of CVDs by requiring importing countries to demonstrate that foreign sub-
sidies cause or threaten material injury for a sufficiently large share of the domestic industry. In today’s world 
economy where production occurs in GVCs, the high import content of value added embodied in most products 
implies a need to assess the effects of subsidies on different stages of the value chain.18   
Nonactionable subsidies are particularly tricky. The essential idea is to recognize governments pursue activities 
commonly accepted to be legitimate and, thus, it would not only be a violation of sovereignty but a violation of the 
foundation of democratic legitimacy to restrict them. On the other hand, such subsidies may have competitive ef-
fects. Much of the language in the now expired ASCM provision on nonactionable subsidies involves a notion of 
de minimis effect.  This is not very helpful as significant policies will not have de minimis effects. Regional aid or 
R&D support are significant in the sense of generating potential competition spillovers (Maskus, 2015). It is per-
haps not surprising therefore that the nonactionable subsidies listed in Art. 8 ASCM was not extended beyond the 
5-year trial period. 
Two types of prohibited subsidies are distinguished in the ASCM: subsidies where conferral is conditional on a 
minimum level of local content; and subsidies conditioned on export performance. The direct effect of both types 
of subsidy, like a tariff, clearly affects international competition.  The problem with subsidies conditioned on local 
content is not the subsidy per se, but the explicit discrimination against foreign suppliers of intermediate goods.19 
Export subsidies are also clear in their explicit targeting of trade (in this case, presumably, increasing the compet-
itiveness of recipient firms in foreign markets).20  The real puzzlement about export subsidies, from the general 
equilibrium perspective taken by trade economists is that governments adopt them at all.  Where an appropriately 
chosen (i.e. optimal) tariff trades off the terms-of-trade gain against the cost of price distortion to the decision-
making of firms and households, an export subsidy deteriorates the terms-of-trade and causes distortions.  At the 
same time, at least for some sufficiently small export subsidy, the importing country must gain.  Not only is it un-
clear why a large country would apply such a subsidy, it is equally unclear why the importing country would 
                                                     
17 Every word in this definition provides fertile ground for lawyers, as demonstrated in the WTO case law. For present purposes there is no 
need not delve into this, although we recognize that some WTO members are dissatisfied with the ASCM because of the way the Appellate 
Body has interpreted and applied specific provisions. See e.g. Mavroidis (2016, pp. 200-248) and Rubini (2017). 
18 Hoekman and Nelson (2020) discuss gaps in the ASCM considering the rise in GVC-based production. 
19 This makes it hard to understand Sykes’ (2005, pp. 99-100) objection to a distinction between an actionable subsidy and a subsidy condi-
tioned on domestic content in the same sector, since both affect the ability of foreign firms to compete in that sector. After all, the framers of 
the ASCM contemplated a category of permitted subsidies that would also affect relative prices and, in a general equilibrium sense, interfere 
with trade. The point here is modality, not actual or even intended effects, i.e., the additional requirement that explicitly discriminates against 
foreign suppliers in the sector supplying intermediate goods. 
20 Mavroidis (2016, pp. 268-270) makes an argument for export subsidies similar to that of Sykes on domestic content. The response here is 
the same—the modality directly implies an intention to affect trade. 
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complain about it.21  It is perhaps not surprising that pure export subsidies appear to be considerably rarer than 
the broad class of actionable subsidies.   
Because they are essentially price measures that operate at the border, the spillovers from prohibited subsidies 
can be measured the same way we measure the spillovers from tariffs.  That is, we identify the effect on relative 
prices to the affected country and simply follow through the standard general equilibrium effects of those price 
changes on the economic and political-economic equilibrium.  Unfortunately, prohibited subsidies (or, at least 
WTO disputes over prohibited subsidies) appear to be far rarer than actionable subsidies.  The problem is that, 
unlike tariffs that are targeted on the price of imports, most subsidies do not emerge from the national trade pol-
icy-making process and they affect production structures in ways that are far from transparent. 
3.1 Why Tariff Disciplines are “Easy”, and Subsidy Disciplines are “Hard”: Eco-
nomics 
Spillovers from prohibited subsidies are essentially price measures that operate at the border and can be meas-
ured – as in the case of tariffs – by their impact on the terms-of-trade.22  The broader category of actionable 
subsidies is more complicated as the subsidies are adopted for reasons other than their effect on trade, but may 
still have significant spillovers.  However, even the simplest actionable subsidy is inherently more complex.  This 
will be a subsidy that is in the amber, instead of the red, box precisely because it is intended to respond to some 
domestic distortion (or some domestically legitimate noneconomic objective), but another country will only take 
WTO action in the simplest case because this subsidy with a domestic goal also affects the terms-of-trade.  But 
the existence of a terms-of-trade effect means that there is a second distortion (i.e. pW ≠ FRT).  We know from the 
theory of second best that this sort of environment yields potentially very complex optimal policies and spillo-
vers.23  Unless the economies are essentially identical with respect to domestic distortions, similar policies may 
reflect very different objectives. These complexities still run through standard general equilibrium effects, but such 
externalities are unlikely to capture the main spillovers from actionable subsidies. 
Suppose that A and B are two large economies that produce and export a differentiated product to one another 
and to a third market (C) whose production emits carbon as a byproduct of producing the good.  Each would like 
to reduce carbon emissions.  Many economists propose a system of emissions permits and creation of a market 
in permits as an efficient way of pursuing such a goal.  If country A adopts such a scheme, the additional cost of 
meeting the emission target will change domestic relative prices, but because A is large, this will also spill over to 
world relative prices, with the full range of general equilibrium effects in all national economies linked to A by 
trade.  In particular, A’s policy will tend to reduce the competitiveness of the A industry resulting in a shift of pro-
duction to B, thus reducing the impact of the initial policy.  Country A decides to adopt a system of carbon 
tariffs.24  This seems a reasonable response to policy leakage.  However, suppose that there are external econo-
mies in this sector.  There will generally be a tariff that, even with the environmental policy, by restricting access 
                                                     
21 We refer here to an economic policy rationale. In practice, intervention against export subsidies is likely to reflect political economy forces 
with negatively affected national firms dominating the interests of national consumers who benefit from the export subsidy. Attempts to ac-
count for export subsidies in the case of large countries involve profit shifting (Brander and Spencer, 1985) and/or firm relocation, i.e., where 
policies induce entry, increase competition, and raise consumer welfare (Venables, 1985). While theoretically interesting, this literature relies 
on very special market structures and unlikely policy responses. 
22 This is, of course, the basis for the large body of work deriving from the original contributions of Bagwell and Staiger (2002).  Even here, 
however, there is disagreement about the extent to which terms-of-trade externalities capture the objectives of participants in the WTO politi-
cal/legal system (Ethier, 2001).  
23 There is a large literature deriving from Meade (1955) and Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) analyzing the properties of optimal policies, and 
optimal local policy reforms, in multiply distorted environments (e.g. Hatta, 1977 and  Dixit, 1987). 
24 In fact, the EU has considered the adoption of carbon tariffs to support its Environmental Trading Scheme.  Not surprisingly, China (and a 
number of other countries) have argued that such a system is inconsistent with the EU’s WTO commitments. The current European 
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has made clear that she will seek to implement carbon border taxes as part of stepping up EU 
efforts to reduce carbon emissions during her term (2019-2024).  
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to A, allows the A sector to expand, reducing its costs sufficiently to capture a larger share of the market for this 
sector.25  An additional source of complexity in this case is that A producers are, in aggregate, using a greener 
technology, and B producers may also be induced to use a greener technology, which should raise welfare even 
in the country that did not adopt the policy.  Thus, the presence of domestic policy objectives can render the anal-
ysis of the effects of tariff policy difficult to evaluate. 
Now consider the use of subsidies.  Suppose that there is at least one potential new technology for clean produc-
tion of electric power.  Subsidies to R&D could result in greater effort and earlier success.26  Subsidies to 
adoption – widely deployed through the tax system in many countries – could result in learning or other econo-
mies increasing competitiveness of new technology. Moreover, the identification and bringing to market of such a 
technology would be a benefit to all consumers.  However, in addition to changing production costs, and thus rel-
ative prices, across users of energy, this sort of frontier technology might be expected to be the basis for future 
exports.  The general environmental effect should produce no conflict (that is, agreement on the general goal of 
reducing emissions should make subsidies non-problematic). In fact, the public good nature of such technology 
might even lead to underinvestment.  The gains from winning the R&D race, however, are a purely private good.  
The logic here is very much like the prisoners’ dilemma in the trade war literature.  In addition to competitive pro-
vision of subsidies, both governments might adopt regulatory structures (e.g. standards of various sorts) that 
block adoption of foreign technology.  As with carbon tariffs, such regulations could be production-supporting ex-
port protection.27 
Much is currently made of the opaque nature of subsidies in the context of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as 
opposed to a direct fiscal transfer (OECD, 2016).  Conceptually there is no problem but in practice the required 
information (on cost of capital of the SOE; the fees charged for on-lending or investment; etc.) may not be availa-
ble.28 These are intra-firm operations without intermediation of markets.  But is this really all that different 
conceptually from what goes on in the context of production involving complex value chains? These involve com-
plex combinations of internal transfer prices, long-term contracts with negotiated prices, and spot transactions 
involving very large firms. These involve transactions that are far from purely market-conforming and, thus, will 
not satisfy the standard marginal conditions that underwrite welfare claims.  One real difference is the explicit 
guarantee from the government/finance ministry, but there are also ‘too big to fail’ companies in market econo-
mies. Accounting standards and regulation of large firms that are systemically important is to some extent political 
and heavily gamed. 
3.2 Why Tariff Disciplines are “Easy” and Subsidy Disciplines are “Hard”: Poli-
tics 
As mentioned, differences in economic structure may mean that similar policies mean different things in different 
economies, making negotiation of simple rules difficult.  This problem is augmented by differences in the prefer-
ences of citizens and political structures that will yield very different objectives across countries seeking to 
manage policy spillovers even with the best of intentions. 
                                                     
25 If the aggregate economies of scale are sufficiently large that there are multiple trade equilibria that can be ranked based on the Pareto 
criterion, A’s tariff has allowed A to pick its preferred equilibrium. This is essentially the logic of Krugman’s (1984) “import protection as export 
promotion” argument.   
26 R&D subsidies can take many forms. Patents are one particularly common instrument to support R&D. 
27 Maskus (2015) notes that the presumption that R&D subsidies do not distort competition is based on assumptions that are increasingly 
outdated and that R&D support can give rise to significant competitive distortions. 
28 The WTO does not require reporting of such information. See Wolfe (2017). 
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All market-oriented democracies face a fundamental tension between two core goals: efficiency and democratic 
legitimation.  Pursuit of efficiency involves, minimally: enforcement of contracts and property rights; a broad pref-
erence for market conforming policy; and appropriate response to what the theory of economic policy calls 
“distortions”—e.g. environmental policy, antitrust policy, et cetera to address market failures. Democratic legitima-
tion involves responsiveness to public demands for policy, even if they might be inefficient (i.e. noneconomic 
objectives).  Among the most important of these across virtually all advanced economies are national defense, 
income distribution goals, unemployment insurance, education, health care, and environmental policy.  In the 
1930s, faced with the most significant economic crisis ever faced by democratic capitalism, there was a widely 
held belief that that this balancing act was impossible (see e.g. Schumpeter, 1942; Polayi, 1944).  This fear 
turned out to be unfounded and while the massive post-War boom was relatively short-lived (les trentes glo-
rieuses) the seven decades following the end of the second world war were characterized by unprecedented 
peace and prosperity for the core members of the liberal international economic order created at the beginning of 
that period.29  Along with broadly market conforming microeconomic policy, this was also a period of Keynesian 
macroeconomic policy and substantial growth in the welfare state—a “compromise of embedded liberalism”.   
The nation state and the national economy played a central role in the operation of this embedded liberalism.  
From what Baldwin (2016) called “the first unbundling” (falling international transport costs allowing national firms 
to export) to the transformation associated with “the second unbundling” (the emergence of global value chains 
and complex international production), the fundamental structure of economies was national and coextensive with 
the political systems that legitimated the political economy.  Because firms, produced final goods using primarily 
nationally produced intermediate goods, states could regulate the national economy. Furthermore, because this 
link was clear, national citizens (“civil society” of a country) could condition support for the state on the perfor-
mance of the economy.  The fundamental role of the state is to manage the linkage between economic 
performance and political legitimation 
Given the central role of international trade and capital mobility in supporting the growth and stability that charac-
terized the post-War era, it is not surprising that there was a conscious effort to construct a set of rules consistent 
with the sort of political economy that lay at the core of that order (Ruggie, 1982).  National trade policy in this 
era, overwhelmingly tariff policy, was organized as a relationship between national political economies and na-
tional sovereignty. This was a core normative foundation of that system.30  The core members of the liberal 
international trading system developed a common understanding of tariffs as interfering with the benefits from 
access to global markets, especially large exporting firms that were prime drivers of the national economies.  At 
the same time, those states retained the right to use protectionist instruments (such as antidumping or safeguard 
actions) when the national political economic equilibrium was threatened by trade shocks and policy spillovers. 
The result of the economic and political success of embedded liberalism at the national level extended to the 
global political economy through creation of a liberal, relatively tariff-free international trading system, with the 
WTO as the crowning success. Unfortunately, the Uruguay Round was completed at precisely the moment that 
fundamental changes were emerging that would push that system to the brink of breakdown.  We note three cur-
rent factors of particular significance.   
 First, at least in part as a reflection of the success of the GATT/WTO process, the core nations of the in-
ternational economy are significantly more open than they were in the earlier years of this system. Tariffs 
have fallen to very low levels for these nations (on the order of 2% to 3% average tariffs).  Having bound 
tariffs at these low rates in the WTO, governments facing pressure for protection have increasingly sub-
stituted to non-tariff measures, often in the form of actionable subsidies.  At the same time, the large role 
                                                     
29 In fact, Schumpeter’s fear that what he called ‘socialism’ would replace capitalism materialized, given his broad definition of ‘socialism’. 
30 Finlayson and Zacher (1981) remains an excellent overview of the normative structure of the trade regime of the GATT, whose extension 
to the WTO is direct.  The core of that paper is a distinction between sovereignty norms and interdependence norms that is fully consistent 
with Ruggie’s (1982) embedded liberalism. 
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of global firms (i.e. firms engaged in global production and sales, involving complex global value chains) 
has changed the global economy in ways that render traditional tools used to manage interdependence 
(i.e., tariffs) less effective (Hoekman, 2016).   
 Second, the emergence of China as a genuine economic and political power has been a major shock to 
the system.  The fact that the Chinese economy has a strong market orientation without sharing the same 
market institutions with the US and/or Europe, combined with spectacular growth (and export growth in 
particular), and that the political system is considerably more opaque than that of most other core political 
economies of the liberal international order, has raised serious questions about the extent to which it can 
be a member in good standing of the current liberal trade regime (Wu, 2016).  Given the extensive role 
for SOEs in the Chinese economy, subsidies are an increasing source of conflict (Wolfe, 2017).   
 Finally, and at least in part as a function of the first two factors, we have seen the emergence of anti-
global populism as a significant political force in many of the core countries of the liberal international sys-
tem.  While this does not have immediate, specific implications for subsidy policy, it constrains what is 
possible. Not only do these trends make traditional WTO disciplines less relevant, but they make the 
need for new subsidy disciplines more pressing.31 
 
One of the most difficult aspects of the domestic politics of subsidies, from the perspective of designing interna-
tional rules, is that actionable subsidies emerge from a domestic political process that is not linked to the 
institutions of international trade regulation in any meaningful way.  Specifically, the technocrats, politicians and 
lobbyists with a primary focus on domestic subsidies do not share common legal, political or economic knowledge 
with the domestic or international agencies concerned with managing international trade relations.  Instead, sub-
sidy policies will be related to, often very politicized, domestic issues (e.g. energy, environment, employment, 
income distribution, etc.).  
An additional source of complexity is that the political and economic structures motivating and constraining sub-
sidy policy vary significantly across countries. As emphasized in the now very large literature on ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (VoC),32 not only may a given subsidy policy be understood very differently across polities, the pro-
cess generating those policies may also be quite different, so that the stakes and the patterns of conflict may also 
differ. To this point, we have been presuming that conflicts over subsidy policy reflect primarily conflicts of inter-
est, where “interest” is a well-defined notion that is essentially common across the core nations of the 
international trading system. The VoC literature suggests that a potentially more intractable problem may be that 
the domestically anchored understandings of a given subsidy are sufficiently different across countries to inhibit 
rulemaking defined primarily in terms of modalities of intervention that can be relatively straightforwardly traded-
off.  That is, unlike tariffs (or, at least, to a significantly greater degree), differing political/economic structures 
mean that the modalities of intervention will generally differ, rendering agreement on the political-economic inter-
pretation of those subsidies, essential to effective negotiation, very difficult.   
While the label seems problematic, the VoC approach accommodates the case of China. Although China is nei-
ther capitalist nor democratic, the Chinese Communist Party and state rely for legitimation on economic 
performance, and an essential element of the Chinese economic strategy is a strong market orientation (Lardy, 
2014).33  Furthermore, trade has played an essential role in this process (Zheng, 2004, Branstetter and Lardy, 
2008).  As a result, China has proven itself an active participant in the liberal international trade regime, at least 
as willing to accept the main rules of that system as the US and the EU. 
                                                     
31 Political pressures also translate into demand for domestic regulation of product and factor markets that may have spillover effects as well.    
32 See, e.g., Hancké (2009) or Thelen (2014). 
33 There is a sizable literature on the legitimacy of the Chinese regime, much of which stresses the combination of economic performance and 
nationalism as foundational (Zheng, 2004, Hughes, 2006).  The economic component is an example of what Scharpf (1997, pp. 153-155) calls 
output legitimacy (compared to input legitimacy). The Trump administration seems just as willing to substitute nationalism for democratic pro-
cess (i.e. input legitimacy) as a foundation for domestic legitimacy as does the Xi administration. 
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4 Elements of Extant WTO+ Subsidy Regimes 
A liberal trading regime, like a national democracy, needs to balance efficiency and legitimacy.  As already ob-
served, because civil societies remain fundamentally national, nation states are the only entities capable of the 
kind of robust legitimacy necessary for legitimation of international economic relations.  The core participants in 
the creation and maintenance of any such order will remain nation states. As actionable subsidies are deeply 
rooted in domestic policies, politics and institutions, recognition and protection of sovereignty will remain central 
to international trade regimes. Moreover, because the “true” objectives of subsidy policy will be unobservable, 
cross-national differences in institutions and politics will limit the scope for strictly applied ‘hard’ law. The goal 
should be to construct a system that avoids the uncertainty and arbitrariness of a purely “diplomatic” approach 
while not attempting to construct a “judicial” approach that seeks to change the political-economic system of a 
country. These two goals seem inconsistent, but this is the balancing act supporting democratic capitalism in 
widely differing nation states, in the EU and other ‘deep’ integration agreements.  In all these cases, the tensions 
that exist between legitimation and efficiency, especially as enhanced by the need to cooperate across different 
VoCs, require flexibility and trust.   
Three examples of regimes that go beyond the WTO in balancing legitimation/sovereignty and efficiency are rele-
vant for rethinking international rulemaking on subsidies. Consider first the US.  We often think of the US, 
especially in the context of international trade as a single, unified jurisdiction.  However, the US is very much a 
federal system.  The commerce clause (Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the US Constitution) states that the US 
Congress shall have the power to “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes”.  In addition, the dormant commerce clause doctrine, long established in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, asserts that unless Congress explicitly legislates a state right to discriminate, state and local 
laws that discriminate in interstate commerce, or place an undue burden on that commerce, are unconstitu-
tional.34  And yet, in the case of business subsidies and cases where the state or local government is a “market 
participant”, discrimination is considered legitimate (Coenen, 1998).  As a result, there is significant latitude to 
engage in “subsidy competition” and there is substantial heterogeneity in the use of subsidies across US states – 
including to address market failures (e.g., California being much more activist than many other states). This has 
led to the interesting situation where subsidies provided by the state of Washington that are legal under US law 
have been the object of WTO disputes.35 
An interesting contrast is the EU: a group of 27 countries that have integrated their economies through formation 
of an economic union (with 19 going further and establishing a monetary union and a common currency). Unlike 
the US states, the members of the EU are fully sovereign nations.  However, from the start, one of the core goals 
of the European integration project has been to promote intra-EU exchange through creation of an integrated ‘sin-
gle’ market and limit state intervention in that exchange.  Subsidy regulation in the EU is determined by treaty and 
overseen and enforced by supranational bodies – the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union. EU member states may not act against perceived violations by another member – instead 
enforcement is centralized.  
EU disciplines on ‘state aids’ are part of a broader framework of competition policy and pertain to both govern-
ments and firms – independent of their ownership structure or control. A key focus of regulation is the functioning 
of the single market – assuring free trade within the Union. Four criteria apply for state aid to be illegal in the EU: 
(i) state resources (subsidies, including tax expenditure) lead to (ii) a selective advantage for a firm or activity that 
(iii) distorts competition and (iv) affects trade between Member States. These criteria also apply to undertakings 
                                                     
34 For a recent discussion of the dormant commerce clause, see Chemerinsky (2019, section 5.3).  While this principle is well established, in 
recent years it has come in for increasing criticism. In particular, justices Scalia and Thomas have argued against this as a principle for Su-
preme Court decision-making (e.g., Sachse, 1999). 
35 E.g., United States: ‘Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft — Second Complaint,’ WTO, WT/DS353. See Ossa (2017) for an eco-
nomic assessment of state-level subsidy competition in the US.  
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to which Member States have granted special or exclusive rights, i.e., SOEs.36 Certain types of support, including 
regional aid, assistance for SMEs, R&D, broadband infrastructure, energy and the environment are deemed not 
to distort competition on the EU market but need to be notified (and may be challenged by the European Com-
mission). Agreeing to a set of subsidies unlikely to cause spillover concerns helps focus attention on those 
subsidies that are more likely to have harmful trade spillover effects. A public services provision (Art. 106 TFEU) 
specifies that undertakings “entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly” are subject to the general competition rules insofar as their applica-
tion does not obstruct the performance of their public tasks.37 
An effects-based approach is used in enforcement cases. A balancing test is applied that asks whether the state 
aid aims to address a market failure or an objective of common interest, induces changes in the incentive of re-
cipients to change behavior in a way that meets the goal, induces negative distortions of  competition or trade, 
and the balance of effects (Neven and Verouden, 2008). This approach is fully consistent with the theory of eco-
nomic policy. The aim of the approach was to “shift the argumentation from legal and accounting battles towards 
a battle over the impact of the aid on markets and ultimately on consumers …[contributing]...towards the effec-
tiveness of European state aid control.” (Friederiszick, Roller and Verouden, 2008, p. 626). 
A third regime of international subsidy regulation defines common rules for subsidies that are self-enforcing: each 
government bears the burden of enforcing the commitments made by partner countries and can do so by (re-)im-
posing measures to offset an illegal foreign subsidy. Such cooperation can take the form of “deep” PTAs such as 
the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) or recent PTAs negotiated by the EU 
with partner countries (e.g., Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam). Inter-governmental agreements may be sec-
tor- or activity specific and not linked to market access liberalization commitments. Examples of the latter are the 
OECD Export Credit Arrangement and the G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, established at the 2016 
G20 summit.38  The mandate of this forum, facilitated by the OECD, included producing and sharing reliable sta-
tistics on production, capacity and excess capacity across major steel producers, and identifying measures to 
reduce global production. The forum provided a platform for the exchange of data on steel capacity, subsidies 
and other support measures, thus improving the information base and the transparency of the relevant policies 
implemented by major steel producing countries. The forum reported to G20 Ministers annually during 2017-2019 
and met at least three times a year during this period.39 Such inter-governmental arrangements seek to constrain 
the ability of governments to undo market access commitments through regulatory policies (in the case of PTAs) 
or to limit the scope for a race to the bottom in a policy area (OECD, G20).  
Most extant PTAs have provisions on subsidies (Rubini, 2020). Often these provision mirror those found in the 
WTO.40 Only a quarter of all PTAs go beyond the ASCM and include provisions specifying that certain types of 
subsidies are not considered to be trade-distorting. Most of these are EU PTAs. These subsidies generally per-
tain to public services, regional aid, or environmental protection. Rather than being actionable the approach taken 
                                                     
36 Gutiérrez and Philippon (2019) argue that European market regulation has become more pro-market than the US in recent years. Philippon 
(2019, pp. 134-135) argues state aid rules negotiated among sovereign nations in the EU leads to DG Competition being more independent 
than national regulators facing domestic political pressure, i.e., the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.  It is also salient 
to observe that part of Philippon’s argument is that “economic analysis became more prevalent, in particular with the creation of the position of 
Chief Competition Economist in 2003” (Philippon, 2019). 
37 TFEU Art 107(3) lists measures that may be considered to be compatible with the internal market, including (i) aid to promote the economic 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or there is serious underemployment….(ii) aid to […] to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State; and (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. 
38 See https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2077. Bloningen and Wilson (2010) discuss the economics of subsidies and ex-
cess capacity. 
39 In October 2019, China decided to discontinue participation in the Forum, arguing it had done its fair share by “slash[ing] total steel produc-
tion capacity by more than 150 million tonnes since 2016, or 114 per cent of the global steel capacity cut … and … redeploy[ing] 280,000 
steel workers, which is more than the combined deployed number of steel workers in the US, the EU and Japan.” See 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3034753/global-steel-forum-scrapped-china-says-it-has-done-more-its. 
40 What follows draws on Rubini (2020). 
 Rethinking Subsidy Rules | Page 21 
 
is to call for consultations if such measures are deemed to have detrimental spillover effects. Conversely, a small 
share of PTAs also go beyond the ASCM by including more subsidies in the prohibited category, e.g., in specify-
ing that State guarantees and support to insolvent or ailing companies are prohibited (EU PTAs; CPTPP). 
Surprisingly, it is not uncommon that national treatment obligations apply to subsidies, although this is more com-
mon in older PTAs than those negotiated recently. Rubini (2020) calculates that the share of PTAs in which 
national treatment applies (at least notionally) to subsidies fell from some 70 percent in pre-1995 PTAs to about 
30 percent in post-2010 PTAs. Conversely, the share of PTAs with CVD provisions increased from one-third in 
pre-1995 PTAs to almost 90 percent for post-2010 PTAs. Less than half of all PTAs (128/283) have notification 
requirements for subsidies, while roughly one-fifth have established deliberation mechanisms to address subsidy 
concerns (these are not distinct categories). Interestingly, a nontrivial share of PTAs (19%) include provisions 
calling for cooperation between parties to act against export subsidies granted by nonsignatories.  
Deep(er) PTAs also have adopted approaches to deal with SOEs. As mentioned, in the EU competition law and 
state aid disciplines pertain to SOEs as these are regarded as any other undertaking. Moreover, the EU has im-
plemented a competitive neutrality framework that goes further than ensuring that competition law and policies 
apply to the behavior of SOEs as well as to private firms. This framework, consistent with the OECD Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, focuses on identifying and removing competitive ad-
vantages of SOEs with respect to taxation, financing costs and regulation (Capobianco and Christiansen, 2011). 
The framework complements the explicit inclusion of subsidies in EU competition policy disciplines. EU PTAs of-
ten replicate the language of Art 106 TFEU mentioned above, specifying that entities charged with public interest 
tasks are subject to competition rules if this does not preclude them from performing their public service obliga-
tions.  
Less far-reaching integration agreements often contain specific provisions pertaining to SOEs that require them to 
operate on a commercial basis and prohibit anti-competitive behavior. The CPTPP imposes nondiscrimination 
obligations on SOEs, requires them to act on a commercial basis; and prohibits provision of non-commercial as-
sistance (subsidies) that has adverse effects or injures the interests of another party. Subsidies to SOEs, both 
direct fiscal transfers and indirect subsidies, are actionable and signatories must publish data on both extant 
SOEs and measures used to assist them (Kawase and Ambashi, 2018). Two thirds of the 283 PTAs assessed by 
Rubini and Wang (2020) include language requiring SOEs to behave in accordance with commercial considera-
tions. In practice, making this meaningful will involve assessments of whether SOEs have hard budget constraints 
– i.e., are subsidized and/or provide subsidies in turn.  Not surprisingly, some 70 percent of extant PTAs with 
SOE provisions include subsidy disciplines that apply to SOEs; more surprisingly, only a little over one-third of 
PTAs that include SOE provisions have notification requirements, and only 10 out of 283 foresee collaboration in 
generating information on the operations of SOEs (Rubini and Wang, 2020). 
In the next subsection, we discuss some institutional elements that support these existing regimes and are porta-
ble to a broader international regime for the regulation of subsidies. 
5 Good Practices and Economic Policy Principles 
A stable, effective subsidy regime will require reliance on relatively simple, robust rules of thumb relating to both 
the domestic content of subsidies and the nature and magnitude of spillovers.  Aside from the existing consensus 
reflected in the WTO on prohibiting export subsidies,41 a prohibition also found in many PTAs, rules of thumb can 
help to recognize the complex ways domestic and international political economies are interrelated. The theory of 
economic policy is very useful in doing so.  Given any underlying economy and government objective function, 
                                                     
41 While WTO prohibitions on both export subsidies and domestic content are relatively clear, the US permits states to discriminate on the 
local content subsidies. In some policy areas such as public procurement discrimination is permitted by the WTO unless members have 
signed the Government Procurement Agreement. 
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the optimal (or constrained optimal) policy for dealing with, say, an environmental externality will differ signifi-
cantly from a policy intended to distort trade.  Rules of thumb such as a presumption that price-based measures 
are more efficient than quantity-based measures (such as domestic content requirements), nondiscrimination and 
incorporating some broad measure of consumer welfare in evaluation of national gains and spillovers, provide a 
more robust basis for policy evaluation.42 Equally important, the theory suggests the importance of taking seri-
ously the presumption that subsidies may be the most appropriate instrument to deal with market failures as they 
can target either production or consumption. Agreement on “best practice” that links accepted policy goals to in-
strument choice rooted in the theory of economic policy could identify approaches that create a rebuttable 
presumption against anti-subsidy responses. 
“Rules of thumb” support good faith discourse on domestically relevant subsidies and possible international spillo-
vers in ways that permit technocratic cooperation. This sort of approach forms a substantial part of competition 
policy analysis, where current thinking emphasizes a goal of ensuring the efficiency of the market and proceeds 
from a presumption that market outcomes are likely to be relatively efficient.  However, that is only a presumption. 
A variety of factors related to market structure, barriers to entry and upstream and downstream effects can enter 
into a rejection of that presumption (e.g., Bolton et al., 1999).  Similarly, the WTO has a general goal of liberaliza-
tion, but recognizes that safeguards are essential to the legitimate functioning of the system.  Thus, there is a 
presumption that, if a national administrative process is consistent with WTO law, that state has a right to impose 
some sort of protection.  While disagreements can and do arise, as illustrated by many WTO disputes related to 
‘trade defense’ actions, those cases relate to essentially technical questions.  A functional subsidy regime will rec-
ognize the right of nation states to engage in a wide range of domestically warranted subsidy policies, but also 
that conflicts will emerge over modalities and levels of acceptable competitiveness spillovers.  Making such con-
flicts the subject of technical discourses focused on relatively well-specified questions may deflect much of the 
political heat associated with conflicts over inherently domestic issues. 
The multi-jurisdictional regimes briefly considered above, together with heuristics drawn from the theory of eco-
nomic policy suggest several elements of a revised subsidy regime. 
5.1 Identify shared objectives and mutual gains 
For traditional trade liberalization, the essentially mercantilist logic of exchanging “concessions” on market access 
leads to both sides reaping the gains from less discrimination. Analogously, in the subsidy setting, cooperation 
must deliver benefits to all participants by reducing discrimination.43  In the US, this is the point of the commerce 
clause.  Free trade among the states created a continental market that permitted, and permits, rationalization and 
growth among major trading partners (i.e. the states) with essentially no risk that those markets unexpectedly are 
blocked.  The core rules of the EU are similar, reflected in the four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, 
labor and capital), although, as noted above, the EU goes further than the US in terms of subsidy disciplines. The 
WTO does not have free trade as an objective, but pursues reciprocal liberalization of access to product markets 
as an instrument to achieve common development goals specified in its preamble. Deep PTAs seek to expand on 
the WTO in terms of fully liberalizing access to product markets and adopting policies to support competitive neu-
trality. 
                                                     
42 It is attractive to consider a role for global welfare (leaving aside obvious problems defining what this might mean as a practical matter), 
especially when the relevant issues are global in nature (e.g. environmental policies). However, if we take seriously that legitimation occurs at 
the nation state level, it is hard to conceive of how to incorporate such a notion. What can be done is to assess the extent and incidence (dis-
tribution) of the impacts on shared noneconomic objectives, i.e. areas where goals are common. 
43 While the most used metric of benefits is economic (efficiency, growth), there is also a hard to measure but widely recognized benefit that 
runs through a functionalist argument that greater commerce underwrites more cosmopolitan attitudes and more peaceful relations in general.  
This was explicitly a goal of both the framers of the US constitution and the founders of the EU. 
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Determining shared goals for subsidies is more difficult than for tariffs and other border policies because the set 
of possible underlying policy objectives is larger. That said, while the modalities (instrument choice) may differ, 
many goals pursued by national governments are similar across jurisdictions, implying there may be positive spill-
overs as well as negative competitive effects.  In the case of green taxes/subsidies, for example, in addition to 
whatever costs/benefits there may be for national firms from a policy targeting adoption of green technologies, to 
the extent that the environmental externality is global in nature, that public good needs to be recognized.  Specifi-
cally, if provision of a private benefit makes the policy more politically sustainable, that is a plus for all 
participants. With that as a starting point, cooperation on the general goal seems less out of reach.  Such cooper-
ation exists in areas like control of epidemic disease as well as less dramatic areas as macroeconomic policy 
coordination.  An agreement to make consumer/citizen welfare an essential part of any discussion of effects is an 
effective way of introducing these issues.44 
An implication of this is that attention should focus on agreeing to distinguish between rationales for subsidization. 
The competitive spillovers associated with efforts to address collective action problems and market failures 
should be differentiated from those where the underlying objective is industrial policy-driven (competitive). 
Measures associated with what is agreed to be a legitimate collective action problem may have competitive ef-
fects, but in principle these should treated differently from spillovers arising from subsidies that are not motivated 
by market failures.  
This is not new ground for the WTO. Art. XX GATT and Art. XIV GATS provide for exceptions to trade policy com-
mitments made in WTO agreements if necessary to protect public morals; human, animal or plant life or health; or 
conserve exhaustible natural resources. The so-called green box approach used in the Agreement on Agriculture 
exempts subsidies deemed to not distort trade, or at most cause minimal distortion.  These include direct income 
support for farmers decoupled from production levels or prices, environmental protection and regional develop-
ment programs. The Agreement also allows developing countries additional flexibilities in providing domestic 
support,45 in part reflecting a presumption that these are less likely to create significant cross-border spillovers. 
What was included in the now defunct Art. 8 of the ASCM was too limited and narrow in scope (Cosbey and 
Mavroidis, 2014). It did not encompass an explicit recognition that some subsidies are much less of a concern 
that others, and that one of the tasks of governments is to address market failures – including problems global in 
nature. Disciplines need to consider (be conditioned on) what governments are aiming to do, implying asking 
what the underlying problem or objective is, and differentiating economic from noneconomic goals. Countries 
need to know what a government’s goal is to assess if measures are fit for purpose and engage in evaluation of 
alternative instruments and their practical feasibility. 
5.2 Competitive neutrality and non-discrimination 
Nondiscrimination norms are deeply embedded in liberal political economies. In US constitutional law, the privi-
leges and immunities clause (Article IV, section 2, clause 1: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States”) prevents one state from treating the citizens of an-
other state differently than its own citizens.  Similarly, Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union prohibits discrimination based on nationality.  In the WTO, the combination of most favored nation and na-
tional treatment serve to underwrite similar norms of non-discrimination in international commerce.  However, 
even in the US, it is widely accepted that state governments will have different goals, presumably reflecting (at 
                                                     
44 As noted previously, while it is attractive to emphasize global welfare, there is no entity responsible for global welfare and no global civil 
society to claim the benefit.  There is, however, a collective benefit to the members of the subsidy regime: insofar as certain noneconomic 
objectives are common – e.g., reducing greenhouse gas emissions – their pursuit will have global positive spillover benefits. 
45 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm 
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least in part) differing preferences of citizens and will pursue common goals with different strategies.  The mas-
sive literature on federalism stresses both the democratic and efficiency (via experimentation) gains from the 
coexistence of multiple regulatory/political economic regimes (e.g., Burgess, 2006, Bednar, 2009). For such pol-
icy experiments to be sustainable, local taxation must produce local public goods for local citizens and thus may 
require restricting access to such public goods, and to fiscal resources, to local citizens.  This is one of the main 
justifications for the permissiveness toward locally targeted subsidies in the general context of the dormant com-
merce clause principle (Coenen, 1998). 
Consider again the case of green subsidies.  Because these pursue a widely accepted goal, policies (i.e. subsi-
dies) pursuing such a goal should be non-actionable. However, there will be policy spillovers. If policy 
discriminates in favor of domestic firms, the associated competitive distortion will lead to conflict. A rule of thumb 
creating a presumption in favor of national treatment can narrow the range of conflict. Indeed, basic economic 
policy principles suggest non-discrimination will be more efficient in attaining the noneconomic objective. This is 
politically challenging. Strong pressure to reserve at least some of the subsidy benefit for local firms is likely – 
after all, the revenues supporting the subsidy presumably derive from local taxes.  
It makes sense in this context to treat non-discrimination as a rebuttable presumption.  That is, the provider of a 
subsidy that targets an agreed “good” goal (e.g., greening the economy) should be allowed to present a case for 
violation of non-discrimination in terms of political constraints and economic goals that are understood by all 
members of the regime. One way of doing so is to put in place collaborative processes to consider such effects 
and assess if they can be attenuated. What matters here is whether the measure used is efficient (in the sense 
used in the theory of economic policy). If so, competitive effects are likely to be desirable, needed to change be-
havior and attain (non)economic objectives that all parties have agreed ex ante are legitimate. Conversely, in the 
case where a subsidy cannot be justified as dealing with a collective action/market failure problem reciprocity is 
appropriate – countries should be able to use CVDs or bring disputes alleging adverse effects, as permitted by 
the ASCM.46  
5.3 Evidence and evaluation 
One input into narrowing the range of potential conflict is to ensure national subsidy regimes are transparent. It is 
precisely because national political economies are sufficiently different to render clarity of purpose obscure, that 
clarity on both the modalities of intervention and the processes that produce those interventions are particularly 
important.  A central need here is to both measure and analyze the prevalence and effects of subsidies using 
comprehensively documented methodologies that consider the purported goals of the policy instruments used. 
Agreeing on comparable measures of subsidy is important to create a basis for ongoing consultation.  
The approach taken in the WTO to fostering policy transparency is to rely on notifications by WTO members com-
plemented by periodic peer reviews of national trade policies informed by reports prepared by the secretariat. 
Many WTO members do not live up to the notification commitments they have made (Wolfe, 2018). Proposals to 
remedy this deficiency, such as imposing penalties for late or incomplete reporting as has been proposed by the 
US, EU and other countries is unlikely to do much to improve matters.47 Creating positive incentives for greater 
transparency by demonstrating the value of compiling information on domestic policies to governments for the 
design and evaluation of programs and providing assistance to adopt good national practices is likely to be more 
                                                     
46 Similar tensions arise in the public procurement context where strict reciprocity is central to the plurilateral Government Procurement Agree-
ment (Hoekman, 2018). 
47 See “Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements Under WTO Agreements,” JOB/GC/204/Rev.2 (June 
27, 2019). This revised proposal contains several positive elements, including a recognition that developing countries may need assistance to 
compile information. The EU, Japan and US have proposed that non-notified subsidies that identified by trading partners automatically should 
be deemed to be prohibited, See https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf. 
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effective.  The theory of economic policy discussed earlier suggests a cooperative as opposed to adversarial ap-
proach is called for, centered on joint engagement, consultation and deliberation informed by agreed measures of 
policy interventions and analysis of their economic effects and cross-border spillovers.  
A necessary condition for this to be feasible is delegation of both measurement and analysis to a trusted, neutral 
and technically capable body that acts as an agent for the principals (governments; legislatures; private sector 
stakeholders). The OECD has played this role for decades in producing comparable analyses of subsidy regimes 
in agriculture (OECD, 2019a), and more recently, fisheries, biofuels and fossil fuel subsidies (OECD, 2017; 
2019b) as well as studies of subsidies in specific sectors, e.g., aluminum (OECD, 2019c) and semiconductors 
(OECD, 2019d).48 The OECD experience illustrates the importance of conceptualizing transparency as going be-
yond documenting policies – as done by the WTO TPRM – to measure the magnitude of interventions using well-
defined indicators such as the producer support estimate (PSE) in agriculture, and using these as inputs into as-
sessments of the economic incidence and effects of the policies of interest. It also reveals the need to go beyond 
a mechanical reliance on ‘notifications’ and working closely with governments to build ‘ownership’ of the process. 
Wolfe (2020a) discusses the factors that allowed the OECD to calculate and report PSEs for agriculture in the 
1980s, noting that key factors were demand by Finance ministers seeking to control agricultural support levels 
and strong leadership by the United States, which wanted to reduce European agricultural protection. Given that 
subsidies are costly to the budget a similar dynamic might emerge today. More generally, because Trade minis-
ters have no control over subsidies, support for emulating the PSE example will have to come from other parts of 
government. Wolfe (2020a) notes that neither the OECD Council nor the G20 has revealed interest in measuring 
and assessing the effects of non-agricultural subsidies, but the fact that such interest was demonstrated for steel 
(reflected in the creation of Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity) and the EU-Japan-US trilateral process – 
both Ministerial-level bodies – suggests that at least for some of the large players industrial subsidies are a major 
concern and that an analogous dynamic might be orchestrated. 
Measures such as the PSE are inputs into international deliberation and not directly useful for negotiating pur-
poses. The PSE did not end up being the focal point for the WTO Agreement on Agriculture for reasons explained 
by Wolfer (2020a). This arguably is not a problem for inducing cooperation on industrial subsidies as what is 
needed is not hard law (binding rules) but a law and economics informed approach that focuses on establishing 
facts (baselines) and developing a common understanding of the welfare effects of subsidies. There is much 
sound and fury around Chinese industrial subsidies, but very little focus on the many subsidy measures imple-
mented by other G20 countries documented by the Global Trade Alert. The fact is that we do not know enough 
about the effects of different types of subsidies, their motivation, and their cross-border spillover effects to make a 
compelling case for specific new rules. Moreover, even if rules could be agreed, it is important to put in place pro-
cesses that allow an effects-based approach to be used (e.g., the type of balancing test applied in the EU 
context). Such a competition policy approach also allows the flexibility needed to assess the magnitude of subsi-
dies and their effects in different contexts and market structures. In the current multilateral context such an 
approach will of course not be able to focus on enforcement, but the methods and conceptual framework can be 
applied to build a better understanding of the effects of subsidies. 
6 Moving Forward Incrementally 
No subsidy regime can function without full participation of the United States, the European Union, and the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.  On the one hand, this means that any such regime be seen as supporting the 
generalized gains from trade/global production, and not as an attempt to isolate or “reform” China.  On the other 
hand, this means that China should accept that it has a leading role to play in that regime.  Together, these do not 
mean that China must meekly accept the rules of international trade as currently constituted, or as they are con-
templated in the US, the EU or the EU-Japan-US trilateral discussions.  Rather, China, the EU and the US – the 
                                                     
48 One of the great virtues of this work is the explicit incorporation of value chains into the analysis. 
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dominant players in the global trading system – should recognize their political economies are consistent with a 
broadly liberal international regime but are, and will remain, profoundly different from one another.  
Any reform of the existing international subsidy regime needs to center on commitments to cooperate in compiling 
and sharing information and analysis of subsidies with the view to resolving conflicts. In the absence of a Su-
preme Court or a European Court of Justice for the global trade system, the regime must rely on good faith 
bargaining by all participants, backstopped by national anti-subsidy law (countervailing duties), i.e., retaliation. 
We have suggested desirable elements of such a regime in the foregoing. A key ingredient is to agree on estab-
lishing the information compilation and ‘clearing house’ function needed to prepare the ground for agreement on 
new rules that are mutually beneficial to the participants. 
Building an epistemic community 
Wolfe (2017) argues that in areas where the parties lack consensual understanding of the issues, and relations of 
trust are yet to emerge, premature efforts to create binding rules through negotiations or WTO disputes are un-
likely to succeed. Successful WTO agreements addressing regulatory policies such as the agreements on 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade and trade facilitation are all associated with a 
body of agreed technical knowledge and accumulated good will among the relevant national regulatory agencies. 
Peter Haas (1992) refers to a group of people linked in this way as an epistemic community.  Specifically, he de-
fines an epistemic community as a group of professionals with 
 a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social ac-
tion of community members; 
 shared causal beliefs, derived from their analysis of practices to address problems in their domain, that 
serve as the basis for understanding linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes;  
 shared notions of validity—criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; 
and  
 a set of common practices—associated with the problems to which their professional competence is di-
rected with a view to enhance welfare. 
Haas is interested in epistemic communities precisely for the way in which they ease international cooperation in 
policy domains characterized by a substantial degree of technical knowledge that can form part of the basis for 
such cooperation.  There are a wide variety of policy domains in which such epistemic communities help support 
international cooperation, among others: central bank policy and banking regulation (Kapstein, 1992); competition 
policy (Tarullo, 2000, Maher, 2002; Kovacic and Hollman, 2011); environmental policy (Abbott, 2012); and prod-
uct safety (Livermore, 2006).49 
At this point in time, no such community exists around the international regulation of subsidies. This issue strad-
dles domestic and international communities generally and a wide variety of specific policy areas.  In addition, as 
in many areas, there is a significant gap between the ways economists and lawyers, both groups of which are 
essential, understand issues like subsidies.  Neither of these gaps in community are unbridgeable.  The case of 
competition policy is particularly interesting, not only have lawyers and economists found common ways to under-
stand the issues of competition policy that incorporate both legal and economic fundamentals (Eisner, 1991) but 
there is substantial cooperation at the EU level  (Waarden and Drahos, 2002, Wilks, 2005).   
An essential question is, then, how to begin to create such an epistemic community.  One key output and a po-
tential foundation for cooperation and legitimation would be the creation of commonly agreed forms of 
information.  This information sharing is the sort of cooperative enterprise that might help build a perception of 
                                                     
49 While much of this literature emphasizes state actors, it should be clear that participants in such communities include private standard set-
ting organizations (Yates and Murphy, 2019), NGOs (Willetts, 2011); and various combinations of state and non-state actors (Abbott and 
Snidal, 2009). 
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common purpose. As noted in Hoekman and Nelson (2020), many government agencies and international organi-
zations are involved in the design and implementation of subsidy policies, but there is no international forum that 
brings these specialists together. Relevant players include national Finance ministries and competition agencies 
as well as sectoral authorities. Many international organizations collect information on and monitor the use of sub-
sidy instruments, notably the IMF and the OECD, but also UN bodies and specialized sectoral organizations. 
Mobilizing an epistemic community that builds bridges across these entities could help prepare the ground for 
deeper cooperation in this area. This could start with mapping what types of data are already being collected, 
what more is needed, and foster the information sharing necessary to build trust. Considering the use of indica-
tors can help legitimate the overall program, as was done for agriculture by the OECD with the PSE.  
Development of a body of professionally competent, peer reviewable, internationally balanced work can be devel-
oped – as already pioneered by the OECD on a sectoral basis (e.g., the OECD studies on aluminum and 
semiconductors) will generate common ways of talking about and thinking about the issue of subsidies.  For all 
the differences in national regimes, it seems probable that (like the area of competition policy) this may support 
agreement over time on good practice norms and standards.  As those become more widely accepted, national 
governments can legitimate subsidy policy internationally by adopting those standards.  The more this is treated 
as a technical, not a political, endeavor the greater the likelihood of an epistemic community on subsidy issues 
taking root.  
Such efforts will need an institutional anchor. The WTO is the obvious candidate. Even though it may seem un-
likely the membership will be willing to give the secretariat a mandate to take on the type of analytical role that 
has been played by the OECD secretariat, the WTO can and should provide a platform to those members willing 
to invest resources into such an effort. This could take the form organization of regular thematic sessions of the 
ASCM Committee;50 a Working Party that spans different WTO bodies that are concerned with subsidy matters 
including those where no rules exist presently (e.g., services); or a new plurilateral effort along the lines of the 
‘joint statement initiatives’ launched at MC11.51 The scope for the formation of clubs spanning the major protago-
nists was illustrated by the G20 Global Forum on steel excess capacity, mentioned previously. It would be 
desirable that such efforts draw on the WTO secretariat, but if not it is important that the WTO be represented 
and can report to the WTO membership on the activities that are undertaken by the group.52 Existing fora that 
bring together entities with the needed expertise and resources include the G20 Trade and Investment Working 
Group (TIWG)53 and the International Competition Network (ICN), an informal grouping of agencies that cooper-
ate in areas of competition policy.54 
Preparing the ground 
We are very cognizant that moving forward along the lines sketched out above is a challenging task. It requires 
buy-in by the major players (notably US, EU, China), a major hurdle in the current environment. MC12 is the obvi-
ous focal point for the launch of an initiative on subsidies and to give political direction to the effort. This can take 
the form of an 18-month work program aiming at recommendations to be considered at MC13 organized around 
type of deliberation and analysis advocated in this paper. WTO members have done this many times before. 
Such an initiative will benefit all members, including the major trading powers, by allowing them to call a time out 
                                                     
50 See Wolfe (2020c) for a discussion of thematic sessions and proposals to expand their use. This could incorporate and build on the practice 
of WTO members raising ‘specific trade concerns’ in WTO bodies dealing with different issue areas – see Wolfe (2020b). 
51 For discussion of open plurilateralism; see Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) and Hoekman and Sabel (2019). Shaffer et al. (2015) and Wolfe 
(2017) argue that informal (‘soft’) law approaches centered around increasing transparency could be organized on a critical mass basis, using 
a ‘reference paper’ approach. 
52  One of the downsides of the EU-Japan-US trilateral subsidy discussions is that they are closed. 
53 This working group includes the major international organizations, i.e., the IMF, OECD, World Bank, as well as the WTO and provides a 
forum for coordination of the activities of the organizations in areas defined by G20 members.  
54 The ICN was formed in 2001 by national competition agencies in part because of the effort to launch negotiations on competition policy in 
the WTO in the early 2000s. See Kovacic and Hollman (2011). 
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on the current focus on bilateral and trilateral talks and unilateral threats, in the process signaling that they recog-
nize the importance of plurilateral if not multilateral solutions to subsidy-related conflicts. Such an effort is not just 
relevant for China. The renewed emphasis by the EU on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and its intention of 
using trade policy instruments to this effect calls for agreement to manage the risk of intensifying trade conflicts. 
An important area of focus of a work program should be to address the information gap. This should involve the 
nascent epistemic community mentioned above, drawing on both international organizations and specialized 
agencies, and include use of web scraping technologies, as is already done by the Global Trade Alert. Reaching 
out to the business community and soliciting their participation in data collection would not only tap another 
source of knowledge but help generate the political support needed to engage in the effort. Companies that are 
active in the international market can be a good source of information as well help to identify what types of poli-
cies have the greatest effect on competition in the market. Working with the private sector raises new governance 
challenges for the WTO, including a need to deal credibly with confidentiality concerns and to address potential 
bias, but this is something that many international organizations and national statistical offices have experience in 
handling. 
Conclusion 
The basic thrust of the argument made in this paper is that international cooperation to establish a framework of 
rules to guide both the use of domestic subsidies and responses by governments to the spillover effects of foreign 
subsidies should draw on the theory of economic policy. The current framework embodied in the ASCM that 
makes all subsidies either prohibited or actionable is not fit for purpose in an interdependent world economy in 
which production is fragmented over many countries, nation states confront major collective action challenges 
and market failures, and governments are expected to deliver public goods and attain noneconomic/equity objec-
tives.   
In 2018, the EU, Japan and the US launched a trilateral process to identify ways to strengthen disciplines on sub-
sidies,55 suggesting expansion of the list of prohibited subsidies in the WTO to include SOEs, open-ended 
financial guarantees, subsidies to insolvent or failing companies with no credible restructuring plan, and preferen-
tial pricing for inputs. The trilateral process is looking to add to the ASCM (and case law) on this and establish 
criteria – “market tests” of various kinds. The fact that these major players are talking to each other is a positive 
feature.  Drafting exercises that build on the ASCM and new disciplines negotiated among members of PTAs – 
notably the CPTPP and EU PTAs – appear to be a pragmatic response to changed circumstances but lack legiti-
macy because China is not at the table. Arguments that CPTPP is a good model because it includes Vietnam are 
somewhat disingenuous given the discrepancy in economic size with China, but elements of CPTTP may be a 
good basis for discussion. The same applies to the EU PTAs that differentiate between types of subsidies in the 
design of rules.  
While recent PTAs offer some guidance, they do not address global spillovers – notably climate change. A narrow 
focus on ‘the China problem’ is misconstrued given the prevalence of subsidies and the basic presumption that 
tax/subsidy policies will often be efficient instruments to achieve legitimate objectives. What has been missing is 
the type of analysis called for by the theory of economic policy: taking seriously the purported goals of tax/subsidy 
policy; assessing the efficiency of the chosen instruments and assessing the associated cross-border competi-
tiveness spillovers, if any. It is not clear to us that officials and legislatures have a solid evidence base on which to 
build. The focus of attention to date has been on (alleged) competitive distortions, not on what the theory of eco-
nomic policy suggests should inform international rulemaking. 
                                                     
55 See, e.g., Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, 9 January 
2019. At: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/january/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting. The latest state-
ment can be found at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf.  
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History offers guidance on how to proceed. Past episodes of major trade tensions and perceptions that the rules 
of the game needed to be bolstered/expanded led to establishment of work programs to help establish baselines, 
common understanding of the issues at stake and a potential agenda for negotiating a way forward. This done 
after the failure of the 1982 GATT ministerial with national studies of services and the OECD-based work to 
measure agricultural support programs on a comparable basis. Similar initiatives are called for today. It implies 
calling a time out on attempts to re-write the rules of the game to address a specific perceived problem (‘China’) 
and prepare the ground for an effort that includes the subsidy agenda more broadly. Much information exists but 
much is missing or incomplete. The first order of business should be to develop a comprehensive baseline. We 
cannot rely on finger-pointing and allegations that may reflect private rent-seeking interests. Putting together a 
subsidy baseline is challenging and will require investment of resources, the benefit-cost ratio of doing arguably is 
very high.56  
This is not to say that countries should not use the instruments they have to address competitive distortions. 
WTO members can use CVDs to offset subsidies embodied in imported goods if these are found to in jure do-
mestic industries. They can exclude Chinese firms from public procurement markets without violating their WTO 
commitments. They can control inward FDI and M&A. They can respond to foreign export credit subsidies that 
escape WTO prohibitions on export subsidies through export support mechanisms of their own – something they 
already do (Dawar, 2020). There is no need to emulate the Trump administration and violate WTO rules and com-
mitments. Governments are not naked—if they feel a need to intervene to offset perceived competitive distortions 
created by foreign subsidies, they have many levers to pull.  
                                                     
56 Simon Evenett, the Director of the Global Trade Alert, estimates that a building a comprehensive dataset on subsidies for the G20 countries 
could be done at a cost of some US$3-4 million. In 2019 the WTO annual budget was US$200 million. That of the OECD was US$400 million. 
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